Strategic Affairs no. 44
The United States, NATO, and the War in Ukraine
Strategic Affairs no. 44
The United States, NATO, and the War in Ukraine
February 16, 2025
The chaos, confusion, and disorder of Trump’s first three weeks at home continued this week at home and abroad.
Abroad, President Trump jumped into peacemaking in Ukraine, and that’s good news. But he started off with a 90-minute phone call to Putin and not a call for classical negotiations that would have involved the United States, Ukraine, and NATO/EU. Indeed, as I type this newsletter, the United States and Russia announced that they will soon meet in Saudi Arabia to discuss the war in Ukraine without the government of Ukraine in the room.
The immediate concern here is that the United States and Russia would make a deal and then impose it on Ukraine, with a European peacekeeping force left alone in the breach as a security guarantee. Students of negotiations may remember Afghanistan, where Trump 45 negotiated with the Taliban, made a bad deal, forced our ally in Kabul to come along, and then coerced Kabul to make concessions to our common enemy. I am sure that Zelensky remembers this bit of history.
The situation was complicated by the appearance of our rookie SECDEF, Pete Hegseth, at a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Brussels. Exercising the diplomatic skill of a MAGA innocent abroad, Hegseth previewed a final Ukraine peace agreement. He said that it would be an “unrealistic objective” to return Ukraine to its pre-2014 borders, that Ukraine should not be granted NATO membership, and that the security guarantee for Ukraine should come from European and other peacekeeping forces, operating outside an Article 5 framework. President Trump later agreed with Hegseth about NATO membership. Hegseth also called on NATO nations to take the lead on European security and raise their defense spending from 2 to 5 percent of their GDP, considerably more than the United States spends at present.
Quick criticism followed by pundits and even GOP senators. For some, Hegseth’s view of the endgame granted Russia rewards that it had not earned with offsetting concessions. Others saw Hegseth talking down to the Europeans who, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, have contributed more total economic and security aid to Ukraine than the United States has. Hegseth’s insistence on Europeans taking the lead on security in Europe downplays the fact that Russia is a strategic nuclear power. Deterrence of future wars will rely heavily on U.S. presence and leadership.
In any case, other Americans walked back a number of Hegseth’s more definitive statements, especially about Ukraine’s NATO membership and whether or not the United States would participate in any peacekeeping force. Vice President Vance, for one, noted that these issues are all still on the table.
The Vice President dropped a bomb of his own at the Munich Security Conference. Rather than discussing security issues, Vance attacked the Europeans for being unfair to right wing political parties and harsh to religion. He said the anti-democratic “enemy within” was a greater threat to Europe than Russia or China. He didn’t criticize human rights in Russia, Belarus, or Hungary, but he excoriated West Europe and the EU officials for restricting freedom of speech, controlling social media, and allowing excessive immigration. More shock and awe. More criticism and pressure on allies while ignoring our common enemies.
If I could offer some advice to our new Administration, it would be this:
NATO is important and useful, not only in Europe but worldwide. Europeans lost over a thousand soldiers in Afghanistan. Despite the war’s unpopularity, many NATO nations did yeoman’s work in Iraq. NATO ships even routinely transit the Taiwan Strait. But the NATO nations are proud countries, middle powers with rich histories. They can be led but not coerced. They are our allies, not our subordinates. Don’t criticize their internal affairs, or how they are dealing with extremism, especially when Trump 47 is daily inventing policies and actions that are patently unconstitutional.
Burden sharing is an old issue. One of my first jobs on the Army staff in 1985! was reviewing OSD’s periodic NATO burden sharing report, a requirement set by an angry Senate to keep the Europeans honest and working harder on defense. The problem of free riding or hiding behind a superpower is eternal. You won’t get any of the NATO nations, including the United States, to spend 5% of their GDP on defense. Keep pushing. Sam Nunn and Robert Gates applaud you. But burden sharing is a condition to endure, not a problem to be solved.
Coordination is key. A good NSC process can create unified messages with a minimum of hiccups and shocking moments. It was pretty clear that the President, Vice President, and Secretary of Defense had not fully coordinated their statements or put their heads together before this trip. The President’s National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz knows how to create coordinated policy, but you have to let the system work, despite all the tedious meetings that it will require.
Trump 47 should follow the Biden policy on Ukraine: Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine being in the room. Don’t repeat the Afghanistan mistake. Don’t try to work the phones and reach a peace agreement with our trusted comrade, Putin. This issue requires patient, face-to-face negotiations among the United States, Russia, Ukraine, and NATO/EU.
Peace in Ukraine will require a solid security guarantee. It will require a U.S. commitment because no nation in Europe can stand face-to-face with Russia because of its size and nuclear arsenal. International leadership requires international presence, not imperial demands. The design of a force that can create a security guarantee without entangling the United States or creating the conditions for another war will take time and creativity. It will require dedicated strategy, complex coordination, sophisticated logistics, artful diplomacy, and buy-in on both sides of the Atlantic.
When you find the solution to making peace in Ukraine, you can then turn to creating the “Riviera of the Middle East” in Gaza.
Joseph Collins is a retired Army colonel who served as Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, 2001-04.
Well said, Joe. Were we just so much smarter then ... or did we just keep our eye on the ball?
Awesome wrap up, Joe! Thanks for putting it there so concisely and eloquently.
You have reminded me of one of the first lessons I learned while serving as the EUCOM Mediterranean policy guy during the late 80s in the midst of the base agreements negotiations with our Allies and partners - Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Spain.
In the wake of changes of command (or key senior leadership, or political administrations), there is a propensity for the new guys coming in to push strongly for quickly developed, on-the-surface simplistic solutions to thorny, long-standing issues. The basic rule: If the proposed “solution” is obvious and easy, then it’s going to be a non-starter, leading to waste of time and resources, and likely exacerbation of the issue.